Aaron YelowitzApplied economist · University of Kentucky
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ECO 725 · Fall 2017

Health Economics

Historical syllabus; policies and dates reflect this term.

Archived syllabus. Policies, dates, assignments, and readings reflect Fall 2017.

Course information

ECO 725-001: HEALTH ECONOMICS Syllabus and Reading List, Fall 2017 University of Kentucky MW, 1:30-2:45 PM, B&E 171

Aaron Yelowitz 323B* B&E Building (Economics Dept) 334A B&E Building (Schnatter Suite) Email: aaron@uky.edu

Fall 2017 Office Hours: Mon/Wed., 10am-1 pm (or by appt.) in B&E 323B

Course Goals

This course examines the organization, financing, and management of the U.S. health care system and programs, and emphasizes contemporary health policy concerns. By the end of the semester, students should have the institutional knowledge and analytic tools needed to contribute to current public policy debates about health and medical care. Specifically,

  • Be familiar with basic facts about the U.S. health care system
  • Be familiar with the major economic issues in health care policy
  • Have experience using economic policy analysis to evaluate public policy issues in health care

In addition, one of the main goals that I have an instructor is to encourage students to explore dissertations that involve the health care system. My philosophy with graduate teaching is that the main goal is to move you toward writing a dissertation.

Readings

Some articles come from the Handbook of Health Economics (HHE), as well as the AER, QJE, JPE, and J. Health Economics. In addition, several health-related journals (Health Affairs, Health Services Research, and Inquiry) are also relevant, as well an undergraduate textbook (Health Economics, Jay Battacharya, Timothy Hyde, and Peter Tu, 1st Edition, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). readingswith a “*” will be discussed in lecture.

Cancelled classes: 9/4 (Labor day), 11/22 (Thanksgiving break)

Major milestones: 10/2 (research paper proposal due), 11/6 (presentation proposal due), 11/27 (research paper due), 11/29, 12/4, 12/6 (presentations), 12/12, 8-10 AM (final exam).

Grading

In order to encourage students to conduct original research in health economics and move along on their dissertations, the grading will consist of the following:

Research Paper 50% Final Exam 35% In-class presentation 15%

  1. In-class presentation (15%) – The field of health economics is vast and the goal of the in-class presentation is to teach the entire class about an unexplored aspect of health economics. The presentations will be around 20 minutes each (with 5 minutes for questions), and will take the final three class sessions (11/29, 12/4, 12/6). You must have the topic approved by me. The topics should focus on timely issues in health economics, such as the Massachusetts health reform, the Affordable Care Act’s “young adult” provisions or establishment of health insurance marketplaces, the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment, adult Medicaid expansions, Medicare Part D reforms, or Average Wholesale Pricing issues in pharmaceuticals. Other timely topics are also encouraged. Presentation proposals will be due in class by 11/6/2017.
  2. Research Paper (50%) – All students will use publicly available data of their choosing (i.e., HCUP, BRFSS, NHIS, NIS, CPS, ACS, SIPP, PSID, NLSY, GSS, NSAF, HRS, AHEAD, Vital Statistics, Census PUMS, Google Trends, etc.) to ask and answer a research question related to health economics. Students will provide data, programs, log files and write-up in electronic form. All programming must be done in Stata and write-up must be in Word. Although we will expand on this later, the write-up must not exceed 2000 words (approximately 12 manuscript pages), including diagrams, figures, tables and references. The word count will be strictly enforced, and the overall goal is to have a paper that exactly conforms to the guidelines from Economics Letters or Health Economics Letters. See http://www.elsevier.com/journals/economics-letters/0165-1765/guide-for-authors. Your proposal will be due by 10/2/2017. I will give you feedback by 10/9/2017. The paper (and programs, log files, data) will be due on 11/27/2017.
  3. Final exam (35%) – There will be an in-class final exam during final exam week, on Tuesday, 12/12/2017 from 8-10 AM. The exam will be closed book and cumulative. According to http://www.uky.edu/registrar/content/fall-final-exam-schedule, to determine the final examination time for a course that meets at time other than the usual MWF or TR meeting pattern, the course start time will be considered as meeting at the beginning of that hour (hence, 1 PM).

Excused Absences Students need to notify the professor of absences prior to class when possible. Senate Rules 5.2.4.2 defines the following as acceptable reasons for excused absences: (a) serious illness, (b) illness or death of family member, (c) University-related trips, (d) major religious holidays, and (e) other circumstances found to fit “reasonable cause for nonattendance” by the professor. Students anticipating an absence for a major religious holiday are responsible for notifying the

Instructor

in writing of anticipated absences due to their observance of such holidays no later than the last day in the semester to add a class. Two weeks prior to the absence is reasonable, but should not be given any later. Information regarding major religious holidays may be obtained through the Ombud (, <http://www.uky.edu/Ombud/ForStudents_ExcusedAbsences.php> ). Students are expected to withdraw from the class if more than 20% of the classes scheduled for the semester are missed (excused) per University policy. Per Senate Rule 5.2.4.2, students missing any graded work due to an excused absence are responsible: for informing the Instructor of Record about their excused absence within one week following the period of the excused absence (except where prior notification is required); and for making up the missed work. The professor must give the student an opportunity to make up the work and/or the exams missed due to an excused absence, and shall do so, if feasible, during the semester in which the absence occurred.

Verification of Absences Students may be asked to verify their absences in order for them to be considered excused. Senate Rule 5.2.4.2 states that faculty have the right to request “appropriate verification” when students claim an excused absence because of illness, or death in the family. Appropriate notification of

Absences

due to University-related trips is required prior to the absence when feasible and in no case more than one week after the absence.

Academic Integrity

Per University policy, students shall not plagiarize, cheat, or falsify or misuse academic records. Students are expected to adhere to University policy on cheating and plagiarism in all courses. The minimum penalty for a first offense is a zero on the assignment on which the offense occurred. If the

offense is considered severe or the student has other academic offenses on their record, more serious penalties, up to suspension from the University may be imposed. Plagiarism and cheating are serious breaches of academic conduct. Each student is advised to become familiar with the various forms of academic dishonesty as explained in the Code of Student Rights and Responsibilities. Complete information can be found at the following website: http://www.uky.edu/Ombud. A plea of ignorance is not acceptable as a defense against the charge of academic dishonesty. It is important that you review this information as all ideas borrowed from others need to be properly credited. Senate Rules 6.3.1 (see http://www.uky.edu/Faculty/Senate/ for the current set of Senate Rules) states that all academic work, written or otherwise, submitted by students to their instructors or other academic supervisors, is expected to be the result of their own thought, research, or selfexpression. In cases where students feel unsure about a question of plagiarism involving their work, they are obliged to consult their instructors on the matter before submission. When students submit work purporting to be their own, but which in any way borrows ideas, organization, wording, or content from another source without appropriate acknowledgment of the fact, the students are guilty of plagiarism. Plagiarism includes reproducing someone else's work (including, but not limited to a published article, a book, a website, computer code, or a paper from a friend) without clear attribution. Plagiarism also includes the practice of employing or allowing another person to alter or revise the work, which a student submits as his/her own, whoever that other person may be. Students may discuss assignments among themselves or with an instructor or tutor, but when the actual work is done, it must be done by the student, and the student alone. When a student's assignment involves research in outside sources or information, the student must carefully acknowledge exactly what, where and how he/she has employed them. If the words of someone else are used, the student must put quotation marks around the passage in question and add an appropriate indication of its origin. Making simple changes while leaving the organization, content, and phraseology intact is plagiaristic. However, nothing in these Rules shall apply to those ideas, which are so generally and freely circulated as to be a part of the public domain. Please note: Any assignment you turn in may be submitted to an electronic database to check for plagiarism.

Accommodations due to disability If you have a documented disability that requires academic accommodations, please see me as soon as possible during scheduled office hours. In order to receive accommodations in this course, you must provide me with a Letter of Accommodation from the Disability Resource Center (DRC). The DRC coordinates campus disability services available to students with disabilities. It is located on the corner of Rose Street and Huguelet Drive in the Multidisciplinary Science Building, Suite 407. You can

http://www.uky.edu/DisabilityResourceCenter.

Class Timeline

Note: Readings will be made available to students in electronic form when possible.

WEEK 1: 8/23 Lecture - Overview of syllabus and papers and goals of course. Lay out expectations with respect to turning in paper (i.e. Word) and statistical programs (i.e. Stata, log files, do files).

Objectives

of having 2000-word papers and with no shirking or procrastination. Final exam discussion. HCUP research team training for data use.

WEEKS 2/3: 8/28, 8/30, 9/6 - Yelowitz video on online data sources. Objective: be fast and correct with data sources, and in very short order, figure out whether there is sufficient potential with a dataset to move forward of a topic. Documenting data, internet data, data presentation. Examples of data sources: (a) Publicly available, pros/cons, (b) Data scraping (i.e. Diamonds), (c) Non-public, expensive data (i.e., Nielsen data, College of Pharmacy), (d) “Free” data with severe hoops (i.e. Census RDC, IRB approval, process of getting findings approved), (e) “Free” data with “buy-in” -- I.e. data from employer. Difference-in-differences handout, Standard error corrections

WEEK 4: 9/11, 9/13: Overview of health care system and health and economic conditions

WEEK 5: 9/18, 9/20: RAND HIE, Oregon HIE

WEEK 6: 9/25, 9/27: Instrumental variables, weak instruments, credible instruments

WEEK 7: 10/2, 10/4: Medical malpractice

WEEK 8: 10/9, 10/11: Medicaid managed care

WEEK 9: 10/16, 10/18: Hospital behavior

WEEK 10: 10/23, 10/25: Medicare

WEEK 11: 10/30, 11/1: Medicaid

WEEK 12: 11/6, 11/8: Adverse selection & moral hazard

WEEK 13: 11/13, 11/15: ACA, Massachusetts expansion

WEEK 14/15: 11/20, 11/27: Behavioral economics

WEEK 15/16: 11/29, 12/4, 12/6 - Presentations

A. Data Methods, Collection, Documentation, and Presentation

in Health Economics

A.1 Data Sources & Collection, Documentation, Exact Replication and Presentation

  • Yelowitz Powerpoint/video on using data – “Data Sources for Economics Students”

  • Gentzkow, Matthew and Jesse M. Shapiro, 2014. “Code and Data for the Social Sciences: A Practitioner’s Guide.” University of Chicago mimeo.

  • Edelman, Benjamin. 2012. “Using Internet Data for Economic Research.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 26 (2): 189–206. doi:10.1257/jep.26.2.189.

  • Schwabish, 2014. “An Economist’s Guide to Visualizing Data.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 28(1): 209-34.

Varian, 2013. “Tools for Google Data,” Mimeo.

Varian, Hal R. 2014. “Big Data: New Tricks for Econometrics.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 28 (2): 3–28. doi:10.1257/jep.28.2.3.

Mason, Winter, and Siddharth Suri. 2012. “Conducting Behavioral Research on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.” Behavior Research Methods 44 (1): 1–23. doi:10.3758/s13428-011-0124-6.

A.2 Empirical Methods

  • Yelowitz difference-in-differences handout & examples

Gruber, Public Finance and Public Policy, “Empirical Tools of Public Finance,” 2005, Chapter 3.

  • Bertrand, M., E. Duflo, and S. Mullainathan. 2004. “How Much Should We Trust Differences- In-Differences Estimates?” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 119 (1): 249–75. doi:10.1162/003355304772839588.

  • Cameron, A. Colin, Jonah B. Gelbach, and Douglas L. Miller. 2011. “Robust Inference With Multiway Clustering.” Journal of Business & Economic Statistics 29 (2): 238–49. doi:10.1198/jbes.2010.07136.

Cameron, A. Colin, Jonah B. Gelbach, and Douglas L. Miller. 2008. “Bootstrap-Based Improvements for Inference with Clustered Errors.” Review of Economics and Statistics 90 (3): 414–27. doi:10.1162/rest.90.3.414.

Donald, Stephen G, and Kevin Lang. 2007. “Inference with Difference-in-Differences and Other Panel Data.” Review of Economics and Statistics 89 (2): 221–33. doi:10.1162/rest.89.2.221.

B. Overview of Health Economics and Health Insurance

Bhattacharya, Hyde, and Tu, Health Economics, Chapter 1, “Why health economics?”.

  • Gruber, Public Finance and Public Policy, “Health Insurance I: Health Economics and Private Health Insurance,” 2005, Chapter 15.

  • Gruber, Public Finance and Public Policy, “Health Insurance II: Medicare, Medicaid, and Health Care Reform,” 2005, Chapter 16.

C. Health Status

  • Ruhm, C. J. 2000. “Are Recessions Good for Your Health?” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 115 (2): 617–50. doi:10.1162/003355300554872.

Miller, Douglas L., Marianne E. Page, Ann Huff Stevens, and Mateusz Filipski. 2009. “Why Are Recessions Good for Your Health?” In American Economic Review, 99:122–27. doi:10.1257/aer.99.2.122.

  • Chetty R, Stepner M, Abraham S, Lin S, Scuderi B, Turner N, Bergeron A, Cutler D. The Association Between Income and Life Expectancy in the United States, 2001-2014. JAMA. 2016;315(16):1750–1766. doi:10.1001/jama.2016.4226

D. The Demand for Medical Care and Identification

Bhattacharya, Hyde, and Tu, Health Economics, Chapter 2, “Demand for health care”.

  • Manning, Willard G., et al. 1987. “Health Insurance and the Demand for Medical Care: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment.” American Economic Review, 77:251-277.

  • Aron-Dine, Aviva, Liran Einav, and Amy Finkelstein. 2013. “The RAND Health Insurance Experiment, Three Decades Later.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 27 (1): 197–222. doi:10.1257/jep.27.1.197.

  • Finkelstein, Amy N, Sarah L Taubman, Bill J Wright, Mira Bernstein, Jonathan Gruber, Joseph P Newhouse, Heidi L Allen, Katherine Baicker, and. Oregon Health Study Group. 2012. “The

Oregon Health Insurane Experiment: Evidence From The First Year.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 127 (August (3)): 1057–1106. doi:10.1093/qje/qjs020.Advance.

  • McClellan, M, B J McNeil, and J P Newhouse. 1994. “Does More Intensive Treatment of Acute Myocardial Infarction in the Elderly Reduce Mortality? Analysis Using Instrumental Variables.” JAMA: The Journal of the American Medical Association 272 (11): 859–66. doi:10.1001/jama.1994.03520110039026.

  • Angrist, Joshua D, and Jörn-Steffen Pischke. 2010. “The Credibility Revolution in Empirical Economics: How Better Research Design Is Taking the Con out of Econometrics.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 24 (2): 3–30. doi:10.1257/jep.24.2.3.

E. Malpractice Law

  • Kessler, Daniel, and Mark Mcclellan. 1996. “Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine?” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 111 (2): 353–90. doi:10.2307/2946682.

  • Currie, Janet, and W Bentley MacLeod. 2008. “First Do No Harm? Tort Reform and Birth Outcomes.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 123 (2): 795–830. doi:10.1162/qjec.2008.123.2.795.

Paik, Myungho, Bernard Black, and David A. Hyman. 2017. “Damage caps and defensive medicine revised.” Journal of Health Economics, 51: 84-97.

F. Market Innovation - Supply Side Policies

  • Marton, James, Aaron Yelowitz, and Jeffery C. Talbert. 2014. “A Tale of Two Cities? The Heterogeneous Impact of Medicaid Managed Care.” Journal of Health Economics 36: 47–68. doi:10.1016/j.jhealeco.2014.03.001.

Marton, James, and Aaron Yelowitz. 2015. “Health Insurance Generosity and Conditional Coverage: Evidence from Medicaid Managed Care in Kentucky.” Southern Economic Journal 82 (2): 535–55. doi:10.1002/soej.12064.

Aizer, Anna, Janet Currie, and Enrico Moretti. 2007. “Does Managed Care Hurt Health? Evidence from Medicaid Mothers.” Review of Economics and Statistics 89 (3): 385–99. doi:10.1162/rest.89.3.385.

Duggan, Mark, and Tamara Hayford. 2013. “Has the Shift to Managed Care Reduced Medicaid Expenditures? Evidence from State and Local-Level Mandates.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 32 (3): 505–35. doi:10.1002/pam.21693.

G. Organizational Form and Performance

Bhattacharya, Hyde, and Tu, Health Economics, Chapter 6, “The hospital industry”.

  • Duggan, Mark G. 2000. “Hospital Ownership and Public Medical Spending.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 115 (4): 1343–73. doi:10.1162/003355300555097.

  • Ho, Vivian, and Barton H. Hamilton. 2000. “Hospital Mergers and Acquisitions: Does Market Consolidation Harm Patients?” Journal of Health Economics 19 (5): 767–91. doi:10.1016/S0167- 6296(00)00052-7.

Schmitt, Matt. 2017. “Do Hospital Mergers Reduce Costs?” Journal of Health Economics. 52: 74- 94.

H. Medicare and Medicaid

  • Finkelstein, Amy. 2007. “The Aggregate Effects of Health Insurance: Evidence from the Introduction of Medicare.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 122: 1–37. doi:10.1162/qjec.122.1.1.

  • Card, David, Carlos Dobkin, and Nicole Maestas. 2008. “The Impact of Nearly Universal Insurance Coverage on Health Care Utilization: Evidence from Medicare.” American Economic Review 98 (5): 2242–58. doi:10.1257/aer.98.5.2242.

Card, David, Carlos Dobkin, and Nicole Maestas. 2009. “Does Medicare Save Lives?” Quarterly Journal of Economics 124 (2): 597-636.

  • Abaluck, Jason, and Jonathan Gruber. "Choice inconsistencies among the elderly: evidence from plan choice in the Medicare Part D program." American Economic Review 101.4 (2011): 1180-1210.

Kling, Jeffrey R., et al. "Comparison friction: Experimental evidence from Medicare drug plans." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 127.1 (2012): 199-235.

Huh, Jason, and Julian Reif. 2017. “Did Medicare Part D reduce mortality?” Journal of Health Economics. 53: 17-37.

Newhouse, 1992. “Medical Care Costs: How Much Welfare Loss?”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 6(3): 3-21.

Currie, Janet, and Jonathan Gruber. 1996a. “Health Insurance Eligibility, Utilization of Medical Care, and Child Health.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 111 (2): 431–66. doi:10.2307/2946684.

  • Currie, Janet, and Jonathan Gruber. 1996b. “Saving Babies: The Efficacy and Cost of Recent Changes in the Medicaid Eligibility of Pregnant Women.” Journal of Political Economy 104 (6): 1263. doi:10.1086/262059.

  • Cutler, D. M., and J. Gruber. 1996. “Does Public Insurance Crowd out Private Insurance?” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 111 (2): 391–430. doi:10.2307/2946683.

  • Gruber, Jonathan, and Aaron Yelowitz. 1999. “Public Health Insurance and Private Savings.” Journal of Political Economy 107 (6): 1249–74. doi:10.1086/250096.

  • Yelowitz, Aaron S. 1995. “The Medicaid Notch, Labor Supply, and Welfare Participation: Evidence from Eligibility Expansions.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 110 (4). Oxford University Press: 909–39. doi:10.2307/2946644.

I. Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard

Bhattacharya, Hyde, and Tu, Health Economics, Chapter 7, “Demand for insurance”.

Bhattacharya, Hyde, and Tu, Health Economics, Chapter 8, “Adverse selection: Akerlof’s market for lemons”.

Bhattacharya, Hyde, and Tu, Health Economics, Chapter 9, “Adverse selection: the Rothschild- Stiglitz model”.

Bhattacharya, Hyde, and Tu, Health Economics, Chapter 10, “Adverse selection in real markets”.

Bhattacharya, Hyde, and Tu, Health Economics, Chapter 11, “Moral hazard”.

  • Rothschild, Michael, and Joseph Stiglitz. 1976. “Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 90 (4): 629. doi:10.2307/1885326.

  • Cutler, D. M., and S. J. Reber. 1998. “Paying for Health Insurance: The Trade-Off between Competition and Adverse Selection.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 113 (2): 433–66. doi:10.1162/003355398555649.

  • Buchmueller, Thomas, and John DiNardo. 2002. “Did Community Rating Induce an Adverse

Selection Death Spiral? Evidence from New York, Pennsylvania, and Connecticut.” American Economic Review 92 (1): 280–94. doi:10.1257/000282802760015720.

  • Handel, 2013. “Adverse selection and inertia in health insurance markets: when nudging hurts.” American Economic Review, 103 (7), 2643–2682.

Handel, Ben, Igal Hendel, and Michael D. Whinston. 2015. “Equilibria in Health Exchanges: Adverse Selection versus Reclassification Risk.” Econometrica 83(4): 1261-1313.

  • Marton, Yelowitz, Talbert, forthcoming, “Medicaid program choice, inertia and adverse selection,” Journal of Health Economics.

J. ACA and Massachusetts Expansions

Yelowitz, Aaron, and Michael F. Cannon. 2010. “The Massachusetts Health Plan: Much Pain, Little Gain.” 657. Policy Analysis. Washington, D.C. https://object.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa657.pdf.

Apostolova, M. and Yelowitz, A., “Health Insurance, Fertility, and the Wantedness of Pregnancies: Evidence from Massachusetts,” Forthcoming, Contemporary Economic Policy.

Hackmann, Martin B., Jonathan T. Kolstad, and Amanda E. Kowalski. 2012. “Health Reform, Health Insurance, and Selection: Estimating Selection into Health Insurance Using the Massachusetts Health Reform.” American Economic Review, 102:498–501. doi:10.1257/aer.102.3.498.

Kolstad, Jonathan T., and Amanda E. Kowalski. 2012. “The Impact of Health Care Reform on Hospital and Preventive Care: Evidence from Massachusetts.” Journal of Public Economics 96 (11–12): 909–29. doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2012.07.003.

  • Courtemanche, Charles J., and Daniela Zapata. 2014. “Does Universal Coverage Improve Health? The Massachusetts Experience.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 33 (1): 36–
  1. doi:10.1002/pam.21737.

Gruber, Jonathan. 2008. “Incremental Universalism for the United States: The States Move First?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 22 (4): 51–68. doi:10.1257/jep.22.4.51.

  • Antwi, By Yaa Akosa, Asako S. Moriya, and Kosali Simon. 2013. “Effects of Federal Policy to Insure Young Adults: Evidence from the 2010 Affordable Care Act’s Dependent-Coverage Mandate.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 5 (4): 1–28. doi:10.1257/pol.5.4.1.

Mulcahy, Andrew, Katherine Harris, Kenneth Finegold, Arthur Kellermann, Laurel Edelman, and

Benjamin D Sommers. 2013. “Insurance Coverage of Emergency Care for Young Adults under Health Reform.” The New England Journal of Medicine 368 (22): 2105–12. doi:10.1056/NEJMsa1212779.

Depew, Briggs. 2015. “The Effect of State Dependent Mandate Laws on the Labor Supply Decisions of Young Adults.” Journal of Health Economics 39: 123–34. doi:10.1016/j.jhealeco.2014.11.008.

Cardella, Eric, and Briggs Depew. 2014. “The Effect of Health Insurance Coverage on the Reported Health of Young Adults.” Economics Letters 124 (3): 406–10. doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2014.06.036.

  • Akosa Antwi, Yaa, Asako S. Moriya, and Kosali I. Simon. 2015. “Access to Health Insurance and the Use of Inpatient Medical Care: Evidence from the Affordable Care Act Young Adult Mandate.” Journal of Health Economics 39: 171–87. doi:10.1016/j.jhealeco.2014.11.007.

  • Barbaresco, Silvia, Charles J. Courtemanche, and Yanling Qi. 2015. “Impacts of the Affordable Care Act Dependent Coverage Provision on Health-Related Outcomes of Young Adults.” Journal of Health Economics 40: 54–68. doi:10.1016/j.jhealeco.2014.12.004.

Cantor, Joel C., Alan C. Monheit, Derek Delia, and Kristen Lloyd. 2012. “Early Impact of the Affordable Care Act on Health Insurance Coverage of Young Adults.” Health Services Research 47 (5): 1773–90. doi:10.1111/j.1475-6773.2012.01458.x.

Depew, Briggs, and James Bailey. 2015. “Did the Affordable Care Act’s Dependent Coverage Mandate Increase Premiums?” Journal of Health Economics 41: 1–14. doi:10.1016/j.jhealeco.2015.01.004.

O’Hara, Brett, and Matthew W. Brault. 2013. “The Disparate Impact of the ACA-Dependent Expansion across Population Subgroups.” Health Services Research 48 (5): 1581–92. doi:10.1111/1475-6773.12067.

Dillender, Marcus. 2014. “Do More Health Insurance Options Lead to Higher Wages? Evidence from States Extending Dependent Coverage.” Journal of Health Economics 36 (1): 84–97. doi:10.1016/j.jhealeco.2014.03.012.

Burgdorf, James R. 2014. “Young Adult Dependent Coverage: Were the State Reforms Effective?” Health Services Research 49 (S2): 2104–28. doi:10.1111/1475-6773.12220.

  • Slusky, David J G. 2015. “Significant Placebo Results in Difference-in-Differences Analysis: The Case of the ACA/’s Parental Mandate.” Eastern Econ Journal, no. (Forthcoming). doi:10.1057/eej.2015.49.

Courtemanche, C., Marton, J., and Yelowitz, A., 2016. “Who Gained Insurance Coverage in 2014, the First Year of Full ACA Implementation?” Health Economics, 25(6): 778-784.

  • Courtemanche, C., Marton, J., Ukert, B., Yelowitz, A., and Zapata, D., 2017. “Impacts of the Affordable Care Act on Health Insurance Coverage in Medicaid Expansion and Non-Expansion States,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 36(1): 178-210.

  • Frean, M., Gruber, J., Sommers, B. 2017. “Premium Subsidies, the mandate, and Medicaid expansion: Coverage effects of the Affordable Care Act.” Journal of Health Economics, 53: 72- 86.

Kaestner, R., Garrett, B., Chen, J., Gangopadhyaya, A. and Fleming, C., 2017. “Effects of ACA Medicaid Expansions on Health Insurance Coverage and Labor Supply.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 36: 608–642. doi:10.1002/pam.21993

  • Simon, K., Soni, A. and Cawley, J. (2017), The Impact of Health Insurance on Preventive Care and Health Behaviors: Evidence from the First Two Years of the ACA Medicaid Expansions. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 36: 390–417. doi:10.1002/pam.21972

Goodman, L. (2017), The Effect of the Affordable Care Act Medicaid Expansion on Migration. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 36: 211–238. doi:10.1002/pam.21952

  • Courtemanche, C., Marton, J., Ukert, B., Yelowitz, A., and Zapata, D., “Early Effects of the Affordable Care Act on Health Care Access, Risky Health Behaviors, and Self-Assessed Health,” NBER Working Paper No. 23269, Cambridge, MA. Conditionally accepted, Southern Economic Journal.

K. Behavioral Economics

Ketcham, J.D., Lucarelli, C., Miravete, E.J., Roebuck, M.C., 2012. Sinking, swimming, or learning to swim in Medicare Part D. American Economic Review 102 (6), 2639–2673.

  • Ericson, K.M.M., 2014. Consumer inertia and firm pricing in the Medicare part D prescription drug insurance exchange. American Economic Journal: Econ. Policy 6 (1), 38–64.

Ho, K., Hogan, J., Morton, F., 2015. The Impact of Consumer Inattention on Insurer Pricing in the Medicare Part D Program. Working Paper 21028. National Bureau of Economic Research. Forthcoming RAND Journal of Economics.

Ketcham, J.D., Lucarelli, C., Powers, C., 2015. Paying attention or paying too much in Medicare

Part D. American Economic Review 105 (1), 204–233.

Polyakova, M., 2016. Regulation of insurance with adverse selection and switching costs: evidence from Medicare part D. American Economic Journal: Appl. Econ. 8 (3), 165–195.

  • Handel, B.R., Kolstad, J., 2015. Health insurance for ‘humans’: Information frictions, plan choice, and consumer welfare. American Economic Review 105 (8), 2449–2500.

  • Handel, B.R., Kolstad, J., 2015. Getting the Most from Marketplaces: Smart Policies on Health Insurance Choice, Brookings Institution.

Dahl, G.B., Forbes, S.J., 2016. Doctor Switching Costs in Health Insurance. Working Paper. Accessed from: http://faculty.weatherhead.case.edu/forbes/Dahl_Forbes_Draft.pdf.

Baicker, K., Congdon, W. J. and Mullainathan, S. (2012), Health Insurance Coverage and Take- Up: Lessons from Behavioral Economics. Milbank Quarterly, 90: 107–134. doi:10.1111/j.1468- 0009.2011.00656.x

Saurabh Bhargava, George Loewenstein, Justin Sydnor; Choose to Lose: Health Plan Choices from a Menu with Dominated Option, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 132, Issue 3, 1 August 2017, Pages 1319–1372, https://doi-org.ezproxy.uky.edu/10.1093/qje/qjx011 (updated link)

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